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Abstract—With the widespread of Internet of Things (IoT)
environment, a big data concept has emerged to handle a large
number of data generated by IoT devices. Moreover, since data-
driven approaches now become important for business, IoT
data markets have emerged, and IoT big data are exploited
by major stakeholders such as data brokers and data service
providers. Since many services and applications utilize data
analytic methods with collected data from IoT devices, the
conflict issues between privacy and data exploitation are raised,
and the markets are mainly categorized as privacy protection
markets and privacy valuation markets, respectively. Since these
kinds of data value chains (which are mainly considered by
business stakeholders) are revealed, data providers are interested
in proper incentives in exchange for their privacy (i.e., privacy
valuation) under their agreement. Therefore, this paper proposes
a competitive data trading model that consists of data providers
who weigh the value between privacy protection and valuation as
well as other business stakeholders. Each data broker considers
the willingness-to-sell of data providers, and a single data service
provider considers the willingness-to-pay of service consumers.
At the same time, multiple data brokers compete to sell their
dataset to the data service provider as a non-cooperative game
model. Based on the Nash Equilibrium analysis (NE) of the game,
the feasibility is shown that the proposed model has the unique
NE that maximizes the profits of business stakeholders while
satisfying all market participants.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Data market, Profit maxi-
mization, Non-cooperative game, Privacy valuation
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of Internet of Things (IoT), various
data sources (e.g., not only the massive number of connected
devices but also numerous services/applications) generate a
huge amount of data. According to the reports from Cisco,
the total number of connected devices becomes 28.5 billion by
2021 [1], and the total amount of data created by these devices
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will reach 847 ZB per year by 2021 [2]. Now, it becomes hard
to search, discover, process, and analyze the proper data from
the whole. As a result, big data technology has emerged to
extract the fine value of the data.
With the emerging big data concept, data-driven approaches
now become essential for numerous IoT based services and
applications with the support of various cloud computing
technologies [3]–[5], and data becomes a new valuable asset
for the fourth industrial revolution. Typically, a big data market
consists of three major players: i) data broker (or data vendor);
ii) data service provider (or data consumer); and iii) service
consumer [6]. Specifically, a data broker collects raw data from
various data sources (e.g., publicly available data, nonpublic
data obtained through private contracts, online tracking data,
etc.) and sells big data to other third party data service
providers [7], [8]. Moreover, the data service providers utilize
big data from the data brokers to raise revenue for improving
the quality of their services to satisfy their customers. There
are complex value chains for various ecosystems exploiting
big data. According to the report from International Data
Corporation [9], the worldwide revenue of big data analytics
markets will grow up to $260 billion in the year 2022.
Many IoT services and applications require a detailed anal-
ysis from collected data through IoT devices. According to the
study related to the relationship between privacy concerns and
data innovation through new services and applications in IoT
environments [10], it should be considered not only technical
aspects but also regulatory and economics aspects. These
kinds of heterogeneous characteristics increase the complexity
of assessing the impacts on privacy; therefore, the potential
(intended or unintended) privacy issues may be incurred.
In keeping with this trend, today, IoT data markets can
be categorized into two major approaches regarding privacy
[11]: i) privacy protection market and ii) privacy valuation
market. In the privacy protection market, privacy-enhancing
technologies are provided to data providers, which minimize
potential privacy infringement risks and protect possible pri-
vacy violations caused by IoT services/applications [12], [13].
On the other hand, in the privacy valuation market, data
brokers offer proper benefits or incentives to data providers
(who consider the value between privacy protection and valu-
ation) for collecting IoT datasets under agreement or consent.
Data brokers share revenue from the data service providers as
data consumers to data providers, which makes data providers
motivated to participate in IoT data markets more.
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market are increased because many data providers think their
data as a financial asset [14]. Therefore, issues for privacy
valuation have focused on providing proper economic benefits
to data providers, and one of the important concepts for
this market is a willingness-to-sell (WTS) data with offered
prices from data brokers (simply, the WTS of data providers).
According to the surveys [15], [16], many data providers have
their WTS data with the proper benefits or incentives. In
addition, studies in [17], [18] investigated that data providers
have different WTS depending on the privacy sensitivity of
data types by showing cumulative distribution of the portion
of data providers who wanted to sell IoT data with various
offered prices.
From the above backgrounds, the data provider should also
be considered as a major stakeholder in IoT data markets.
However, conventional studies for IoT data markets have
mainly targeted interactions between business stakeholders
(e.g., data broker and data service provider). Many studies only
consider a willingness-to-pay (WTP) of consumers for pro-
vided services, which are the results of big data exploitation,
because IoT data markets are mainly controlled by business
stakeholders. Only a few studies focused on the behavior of
data providers as a WTS data concept for privacy valuation
(i.e., willingness-to-accept with the offered price for selling
data to a data broker).
The previous work of the authors tackled a data trading
model that jointly considered both WTP of data consumers
and WTS of data providers in a data brokers’ perspective [19].
It showed that the data trading model was feasible even if the
data broker spent costs for buying data from data providers.
However, it only showed a single data broker model without
considering the behavior of a third party data service provider
that is actually exploiting big data from the data brokers.
Therefore, as an extension of the authors’ previous work, this
paper proposes an extended data trading model considering a
competition among multiple data brokers and a data service
provider as well as the behavior of data providers (considering
the privacy valuation) and service consumers (considering
the quality of a provided service) in IoT data markets. The
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
‚ This paper designs a competitive data trading model with
four major players: data providers, multiple data brokers,
a single data service provider, and service consumers to
cover various data value chains in IoT environments (i.e.,
data production, data exploitation, and data consump-
tion). In the proposed model, they are organically for-
mulated in four hierarchical levels with competitiveness.
‚ The proposed trading model among four stakeholders
is analyzed by describing their behavior to maximize
their own benefits. Each data broker competes to sell
the dataset, and the data service provider decides the
optimal budget allocation within the limited budget by
considering a unit price of a dataset offered by each data
broker. This paper proposes a unified method to decide
the unit price of dataset for each data broker, which
makes it possible to compare the competitiveness of each
data broker even if it handles different data types. With
the unified measure, it is formulated as a non-cooperative
game between the data service provider and the data
brokers. The existence and the uniqueness of the Nash
Equilibrium (NE) of the proposed model are shown by
utilizing similar analysis results from the previous work
[20].
‚ The data service provider decides the optimal budget
to maximize its profit with the consideration for both
revenues from the service consumers (which is decided
by the service quality obtained by exploiting the dataset
and their WTP for the service) and costs for buying
dataset from the data brokers. On the other hand, with
the payment from the data service provider, each data
broker minimizes costs for obtaining dataset to achieve
the required dataset quality (measured by the correlation
between each data type and the amount of collected
data) from the data providers by considering their privacy
sensitivity and WTS. The proposed WTP and WTS are
also designed based on literature (which are [21] and
[18], respectively) to reflect real-world behavior.
‚ Based on the theoretical and experimental analysis, this
paper shows the impacts of important parameters of the
proposed data trading model as well as the behavior of
the data brokers (which aware data providers with the
needs for their privacy valuation) and the data service
providers (which take their service consumers’ satisfac-
tion into account). In addition, with real-world datasets,
it shows that the results with data brokers have different
competitiveness in the market.
With the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first paper
that jointly considers not only a competitive data trading model
as a game-theoretic approach between data brokers and a
data service provider but also profit maximization problems of
data brokers and the data service provider by considering the
behavior of data providers that take the value between privacy
protection and valuation into account (i.e., WTS of data
providers with privacy sensitivity of data types) and service
consumers (i.e., WTP and service quality) with characteristics
of data types and dataset quality.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces literature regarding IoT data markets, data trading
models, and privacy valuation schemes. Section III presents
an overview of the proposed IoT data trading model that
consists of four major players. Section IV formulates a data
trading model between the data brokers and the data service
provider as a non-cooperative competition game, and it shows
the existence of the unique NE. Section V and Section VI
formulate profit maximization problems of the data service
provider and the data brokers by considering the WTP of ser-
vice consumers and the WTS of data providers, respectively.
Section VII shows some numerical and experimental results,
including the analysis based on a real-world dataset. Finally,
this paper is concluded in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
The reports [7], [8] identified various big data ecosystems
driven by data brokers. Moreover, Cavanillas et al. introduced
3an overall big data ecosystem in Europe, including big data
value chains, various real-world services/applications, and a
future roadmap for data-driven economy [6]. Various data
market structures and data trading models are also identified
in [22].
Data markets and data trading issues have recently moti-
vated, which mainly considered data brokers and data service
providers. Niyato et al. [21] proposed a simple IoT data market
model that considered WTP of service consumers depending
on the service quality of a data service provider with IoT
data quantity. Ren et al. [23] proposed a data purchasing
and data placement model for a cloud-based data market.
Meanwhile, competitive data trading models also have been
studied. Jiao et al. [24] proposed an auction-based big data
trading model that service consumers bid a service fee to a
data service provider. In this paper, the data service provider
utilized the Bayesian-optimal mechanism to maximize profits.
Jang et al. [20] proposed a data trading model with a single
data service provider and multiple data sources in an IoT data
market. This paper modeled the interaction between the data
service provider and the data sources as a non-cooperative
game and showed the existence and the uniqueness of the NE
point. Moreover, Shen et al. [25] proposed a profit optimization
model using a Stackelberg game approach with the relation-
ships among data sources, service providers, and service users.
Since these studies mainly targeted IoT environments, they did
not consider the characteristics of data as well as the behavior
of data providers that are key factors for data trading markets.
On the other hand, many studies have focused on privacy
valuation schemes as well as WTS of data providers with
proper incentives for data value chains (e.g., literature in
behavior economics). Elvy [11] introduced various privacy
pricing models for data economy. Malgieri and Custers [26]
investigated that the monetary value of data can be quantified
with various data pricing factors by considering both char-
acteristics of data quality and data themselves. People have
different privacy concerns depending on data types, so privacy
sensitivity of data (i.e., privacy attitude of the data provider)
should be considered for modeling WTS [17], [18]. The
concept of WTS (willingness-to-sell or -share) with privacy
valuation considering incentives or rewards of data providers
also have been studied. Jai and King [27] investigated a trend
of WTS data to the data brokers in online services, and it
showed that WTS significantly increased with proper rewards.
In addition, Kim et al. [28] examined factors affecting WTS
based on the privacy calculus theory for various IoT services,
and it showed that perceived benefits had a positive effect on
WTS data.
In the field of engineering, there are few studies considered
the behavior and characteristics of data providers regarding
privacy. Parra-Arnau [29] investigated the trade-off between
privacy and money of data providers and proposed an op-
timization model for profile-disclosure risks and economic
rewards. Su et al. [30] proposed an incentive-based crowd-
sourcing scheme for collecting various data in cyber-physical-
social systems with an auction-based price bidding scheme
for data providers. Tian et al. [31] proposed a contract-
based mechanism for data trading. In this model, the data
seller considered a utility via balancing the trade-off between
data trading benefits and data privacy costs. Ghosh and Roth
[32] proposed an auction-based privacy trading model using
differential privacy techniques. It designed an auction model
between data providers (who considered the chance to reveal
their privacy) and data buyers (who considered their costs and
the accuracy of data analytics using datasets). Oh et al. [19]
(N.B., the authors’ previous work) proposed a data trading
model that jointly considered WTP of data consumers and
WTS of data providers for maximizing profits of the data
broker.
This paper proposes a data trading model with various
stakeholders (i.e., data providers, data brokers, a data service
provider, and service consumers to cover the entire data value
chain) that behave to maximize their own benefits in a data
value chain by jointly considering WTS of the data providers
with their privacy considerations and WTP of the service
consumers with the required quality of service as well as a
competition between the data brokers and the data service
provider.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A data trading model considered in this section consists of
four groups that behave for their own benefits with K types of
data: R data brokers (diqRi“1 participating in the market withpNiqRi“1 potential data provider groups, who are interested in
selling their data with privacy considerations under agreement,
and a single data service provider that provides a service to M
potential service consumer groups. Under four major players
(or stakeholders), an overview of the proposed data trading
model is described in Figure 1, and the entire flow is illustrated
in Figure 2. In addition, the major symbols used in this paper
are listed in Table I. In this paper, the proposed data trading
model considers that each data broker deals with similar data
Fig. 1. The proposed competitive data trading model with multiple stake-
holders in an IoT data market
4TABLE I
MAJOR SYMBOLS
Symbols Definition
K Number of data types in the market
R Number of data brokers in the market
Ni Number of data providers in the ith data broker (i P R)
di The ith data broker (i P R)
ci,k Cost for each data type k P K in di
ci Cost vector for all data types in di pci,kqKk“1
Φi,k The provider’s willingness-to-sell function for the kth data type in di
~Φi The provider’s willingness-to-sell function in the ith data broker
Ui Profit function of the di
qi Quality of dataset provided by the di
M Number of data consumers
ps Subscription fee of each data consumer
S Service quality of the data service provider
Q Expected dataset quality of the data service provider from pqiqRi“1
Ψ The consumer’s willingness-to-pay function
B Total amount of budget for the data service provider
bi Allocated budget to each data broker di
types; that is, each data broker competes to sell their dataset
to the data service provider.
In this proposed data trading model, there are two opti-
mizations (i.e., one between the data service provider and the
service consumers and the other between the data brokers and
the data providers) and two competitions (i.e., one among the
data brokers and the other between the data service provider
and the data brokers) among players.
First, the data service provider decides a budget B to
buy dataset with quality q “ pqiqRi“1, which are measured
by considering both the amount of collected data and the
correlation of them (in equation (18) of Section VI), from all
data brokers. It anticipates the expected revenue by considering
the number of the paid service consumers that can be decided
by the WTP of the service consumers with the offered price of
the service ps and the expected service quality S (which can
be obtained by the expected dataset quality Qpqq). Since the
budget B is consumed as the cost, the data service provider
finds the optimal required budget B to maximize its own profit.
After deciding the budget B, the data service provider
requests a bid to gather dataset from data brokers. The
interaction between these two groups can be explained as a
game model. The first competition is within the group of data
brokers. Each data broker buys data (e.g., location, service
usage log, etc.) from data providers and sells collected dataset
to the data service provider. Simultaneously, data brokers
compete by bidding for their dataset. This can be described as
a normal form game. In other words, each data broker chooses
a bid without knowledge of others’ bids.
The second competition happens between the data brokers
and the data service provider. The data service provider spends
the limited budget B for obtaining datasets with the quality q
to maximize its quality of service S with the expected dataset
quality Qpqq. On the other hand, each data broker receives a
revenue bi from the data service provider by selling a dataset
with quality qi. As a result, the revenue of each data broker
is determined.
Note that this competitive trading model consists of mul-
tiple sellers (i.e., data brokers) and a single buyer (i.e., the
data service provider). The reason why authors adopt this
Fig. 2. Operational flows of the proposed data trading model
model is related to the characteristics of data and budget.
The budget is a tangible and limited resource that cannot
be multiplied by spending the budget; however, data have
different characteristics. Data are intangible goods that are
easily duplicated and copied without losing those inherent
values; that is, the competition model between data service
providers is negligible because the required goods (i.e., IoT
datasets) are not limited in general, especially when multiple
sellers are handling similar data types. Therefore, from the data
brokers’ perspective, they need to sell their collected dataset as
much as possible; meanwhile, the data service provider needs
to find the most efficient way to spend its limited budget.
During the competition, each data broker di also optimizes
its profit for selling dataset with quality qi by considering
both the revenue bi from the data service provider and the
costs for buying data from their data provider group Ni. Since
the revenue is decided by the non-cooperative game, the data
broker focuses on minimizing the entire cost ci “ pci,kqKk“1
to obtain required dataset with quality qi by taking the WTS
of the data providers for each data type k into account.
This paper, firstly, describes the proposed non-cooperative
game model between the data service provider and the data
brokers in Section IV, and then the profit optimization prob-
lems for the data service provider and the data brokers are
proposed in Section V and Section VI, respectively.
IV. NON-COOPERATIVE COMPETITION GAME
This section focuses on an analysis of a non-cooperative
game among the data brokers in the proposed model to prove
the existence and the uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium (NE).
Since each data broker handles similar data types for selling
datasets in this paper, the data service provider allocates the
budget to the data brokers proportionally as in [20] and [33].
In other words, the revenue bi of the data broker (di) is defined
as
bi “ qiřR
j“1 qj
B. (1)
5Note that the sum of all bi cannot exceed the budget B.
This resource allocation model is one of the possible models
for a bidding-based competition among multiple players (i.e.,
data brokers) for the single resource (i.e., the budget B). In
this model, each player is able to obtain the resource with the
fixed unit price decided by the demand of the entire players
(i.e., the entire resources can be distributed to all players
in the market). Moreover, even if a player with an extreme
demand participates in the market, it is possible to make a
balance between the entire supply of the resource and the
entire demand of players because the player makes the unit
price of the resource higher. Therefore, this budget allocation
model is reasonable and feasible for the competition proposed
in this paper. To this end, an expected profit function Ui is
defined for the data broker di, and a non-cooperative game
among the data brokers with a NE.
Definition 1 (Expected Profit Function). The expected profit
function Ui of the data broker di is
Uipqi,q´i, q “ qiřR
j“1 qj
B ´ δiqi, (2)
where δi is the unit price for dataset with quality qi P r0,8q.
As shown in Fig. 1, the data brokers with the expected profit
function compete with each other to get the bidding budget
of the data service provider; thus, it can be considered as a
non-cooperative game among them as defined in Definition
2 and 3. The proposed non-cooperative competition game
among data brokers (CGDB) with the models in equations
(1) and (2) is suitable that players dynamically participate
in the market because it requires the minimum information
about other players. That is, the players need the information
about the budget B and the unit price δ, which means each
player does not need to care about detailed strategies of other
players, unlike leader-follower game models (proposed in the
previous studies [20], [33]). Since data trading is performed
in a real-time manner (e.g., real-time bidding in the online
advertisement market [34], [35]), the proposed CGDB is
feasible for real-world applications.
Definition 2 (Competition Game among Data Brokers). A
competition game among data brokers with the data service
provider is formulated as a non-cooperative strategic form
game G “ pQ, UkqkPt1,¨¨¨ ,Ru and is denoted by the Com-
petition Game among Data Brokers (CGDB). Here, Q “śR
i“1r0,8q is the domain for all data brokers, and Uk is the
expected profit function given by the Definition 1.
Definition 3 (NE of CGDB). A NE of the CGDB G is a
profile of strategies q˚ satisfying
Uipqi˚ ,q˚´ iq ě Uipqi,q˚´ iq, @qi P r0,8q.
Now, the existence and the uniqueness of NE (q˚) for max-
imizing pUiqRi“1 are proved. There have been similar works to
find the NE in various models. Especially, the proposed game
model is similar to the models, studied by Jang et al. [20]
and Park et al. [33], that are originated by Hajek and Gopal
[36] and Johari and Tsitsiklis [37]; therefore, this paper adopts
existing analysis models and presents the main theorems for
the game model. First, Lemma 1 shows the feasibility of the
proposed game model.
Lemma 1. The vector q is a NE (i.e., q˚ of the game to
maximize pUiqRi“1 if and only if at least two components of q
are positive, and the vector q satisfies a following conditions:$&%
1
δi
p1´ qiřR
j“1 qj
q “
řR
j“1 qj
B if qi ą 0;
1
δi
ď
řR
j“1 qj
B if qi “ 0.
(3)
Proof. It can be proved by an argument similar to the proof
of Lemma [33] and [20] by showing that the necessity and
the sufficient conditions hold. Note that the conditions can
be derived by taking partial derivative for qi (i.e., BBqiUipqq).
For the necessity condition, it can be proved by contradiction
with the cases of zero and only one participant. The sufficient
condition can be shown by considering q with at least two
points (i.e., at least two participants for the market).
Since the original CGDB is hard to find the NE solution,
similar to the previous studies [20], [33], this paper transforms
the original game to the modified game model with the
modified utility function Uˆi as shown in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Consider an optimization problem given by,
max
b
Rÿ
i“1
Uˆipbiq, (4)
s.t.
Rÿ
i“1
bi ď B; (5)
bi ě 0, for all i, (6)
where
Uˆipbiq “ 1
δi
pbi ´ b
2
i
2B
q.
Then this problem has the unique solution given by
bi˚ “
#
Bp1´ υδiq , if υ ă 1δi
0 , if υ ě 1δi
(7)
where υ is a real value satisfying
ř
iPt1,¨¨¨ ,Ru bi˚ “ B.
Proof. It can be proved by an argument similar to the proof
of Theorem 1 and 3 of [20] and Lemma 1 of [33] by showing
the first order derivative of the modified utility function and
then applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT) conditions [38]
to find the exact bi˚ . Then, the equation (7) can be obtained.
During the applying KKT conditions, the condition
řR
i“1 bi˚ “
B also can be obtained.
Note that the bidding of the data brokers is non-negative by
Definition 1. A data broker with zero bidding (i.e., qi “ 0)
means that the data broker does not participate in the market.
Therefore, it can be assumed that the whole participants (i.e.,
data brokers) actually participate in a bidding with bi ą 0 and
qi ą 0 for all i P R. Then, the result of Lemma 2 can be
simplified as follows:
bi˚ “ Bp1´ υδiq, for all i P R. (8)
6Moreover, with the condition (8) and the condition
řR
i“1 bi˚ “
B, υ can be obtained by evaluating
řR
i“1Bp1 ´ υδiq “ B;
that is, υ “ pR´ 1q{přRi“1 δiq.
Lemma 3. The CGDB G has the unique NE q˚ with the
corresponding optimal budget allocation b˚ “ tbi˚ uiPt1,¨¨¨ ,Ru
satisfying qi˚ “ υδibi˚ , given by the solution from Lemma 2.
Proof. It can be proved by an argument similar to the proof of
Theorem 2 of [20] and Lemma 2 of [33]. It can be shown as
the modified game model in the equation (4) has the unique
NE point with the conditions from its first order derivative,
and then it can be obtained that the modified game model is
actually the same as Lemma 1 of the CGDB.
Here is the sketch of the proof. First, it is shown that there
exists the unique b˚ and scalar υ such that Uˆipbiq1 “ υ if bi˚ ą
0; Uˆipbiq1 “ 1{δi ď υ if bi˚ “ 0;
ř
iPI bi˚ “ B by showing
that the problem in Lemma 2 has the same unique solution.
Then, it can be shown that the vector q˚ “ pυδibi˚ qiPI is a NE,
and that it is the unique solution using Lemma 1. Finally, it
can be concluded that there exists the unique NE q˚ with the
corresponding optimal budget allocation b˚ “ tbi˚ uiPt1,¨¨¨ ,Ru
satisfying qi˚ “ υδibi˚ .
Finally, the unique NE point q˚ of the original game in
Definition 2 can be obtained by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The CGDB has the unique NE q˚, given by
qi˚ “
BpR´ 1qpřRj“1 δj ´ δiR` δiq
přRi“j δjq2 . (9)
Proof. From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the NE solution qi˚ is
given by qi˚ “ υδibi˚ where υ “ pR ´ 1q{p
řR
j“1 δjq. Then,
substituting it in the equation (8), the equation (9) can be
derived.
With the closed form of the unique NE (equation (9)), all
players can easily anticipate others’ strategies in the market.
From the data service provider’s point of view, it is possible
to decide the amount of dataset with its own budget and
sellers’ unit price for the dataset. On the other hand, from
the data brokers’ point of view, it is possible to estimate their
competitiveness in the market, which is directly related to their
profit.
Since this paper assumes the positive bidding of the data
brokers, the NE q˚ in equation (9) must be positive. Thus,
the proposed data market model must satisfy the following
two inequalities,
R´ 1 ą 0 and
Rÿ
j“1
δj ´ δiR` δi ą 0. (10)
The first condition is related to the feasibility of the CGDB
game; that is, the CGDB game needs at least two data brokers
(i.e., R ě 2), which also is identified in Lemma 1. The second
condition is related to the behavior of each data broker di, and
it can be interpreted as follows.
Rÿ
j“1
δj ´ δiR` δi ñ
$’&’%
δi ą 0, R “ 2,
δi ă
řR
j‰i δj
R´ 2 , R ą 2.
(11)
The first case (δi ą 0) shows the basic condition for a unit
price of a dataset that is provided by each data broker. The
unit price for each data broker should be larger than zero.
The second case (δi ă
řR
j‰i δj
R´2 ) indicates that the unit price of
each data broker should be competitive enough to participate
in the CGDB game; that is, if one data broker has an extremely
higher unit price value than other participants, the data broker
has no chance to be bid from the data service provider. The
detailed methods to decide the unit price δi for the dataset with
quality qi for each data broker will be discussed in Section VI.
V. PROFIT OPTIMIZATION FOR THE DATA SERVICE
PROVIDER
This section introduces an optimization problem for the data
service provider by using the result of NE analysis. It defines
a profit function P of the data service provider by considering
the expected service quality S obtained by a gathered dataset
with the expected quality Q, which is the function of the
gathered dataset from each data broker q with the budget B.
With the expected service quality, at the same time, the data
service provider anticipates the expected revenue considering
WTP (Ψ) of the service consumers (M ) with the service
quality S. On the other hand, the budget B is considered as
the expected cost for achieving the service quality S.
Note that the proposed models about the expected dataset
quality Q and the expected service quality S (based on real-
world observations) are quantification methods for the data
service provider to anticipate the amount of dataset to buy for
maximizing its revenue, and these can be used as some of the
criteria for deciding the market participation.
A. Service quality of the data service provider
Before defining the expected service quality, first, this paper
newly defines an expected dataset quality Q of the data service
provider that is obtained by the entire dataset q “ pqiqRi“1 from
all data brokers.
Three principles (obtained by various existing studies [26],
[39]–[41] regarding dataset quality models) are applied to
define the expected dataset quality with all gathered datasets.
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7The first is data quantity (i.e., size or volume) related to
inherent data quality [39] such as completeness, accuracy. The
second is characteristics of data [26]; that is, the combination
of dataset increases the chance for obtaining identifiable
information. For example, in an online environment, the cookie
syncing technique is widely used to identify and track users’
behavior for the better quality of services and customization.
One study showed that there is a 99.5% chance that a user
will be tracked by all top 10 trackers within 30 clicks on
search results [40]. The last is the law of diminishing marginal
utility that means the marginal utility decreases as the supply
increases and the decreasing rate is inversely proportional to
the amount of dataset [41]. Then, the expected dataset quality
Q is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Expected dataset quality of the data service
provider).
Qpqq “ logp1`
ÿ
iPR
ÿ
jPR,j‰i
ηij
?
qiqjq, (12)
where ηij is the correlation between the dataset qi and qj .
To define the dataset quality function, the geometric mean
(root terms) is the most popular and manageable function
satisfying the first and second principles. That is, the dataset
quality (which the data service provider has) increases when
i) datasets are tightly correlated, ii) the amount of dataset is
large, and iii) the amount of dataset from each data broker
is balanced. Note that when ηij “ 1 (i “ j) and ηij “ 0
(i ‰ j), it forms řiPR qi which is the same as the linear sum
of the dataset quality from each data broker. Moreover, the
natural logarithm function is used to apply the third principle,
which is usually proposed for modeling the law of diminishing
marginal utility (the function decreases inversely proportional
to the amount of dataset, namely, du “ x´1dx [42]).
With the expected dataset quality Q, this paper proposes a
service quality S for the data service provider as the accuracy
of the prediction by exploiting the gathered dataset. This paper
adopts some models from the field of machine learning that
is now widely used for improving the quality of services and
applications [43]. Many studies showed that the accuracy of
the machine learning analysis increases when the number of
training samples increases [21], [44], [45]. The study showed
that an error rate curve of the machine learning technique with
respect to training size follows power-law distribution (i.e.,
decreasing curve with long-tail) [45]. Based on the literature
survey, this paper defines the service quality function S as
follows.
Definition 5 (Expected service quality by dataset exploitation).
SpQpqqq “ 1´ β
1` αQpqq , (13)
α P p0, 1s and β P p0, 1s are parameters. Then, SpQq P r0, 1q.
Note that the adopted service quality model is the same as the
one proposed in [21], which mathematically modeled several
accuracy curves of the machine learning results by analyzing
real-world dataset.
Figure 3 shows an illustration of the proposed service
quality function S for variant parameters α and β. The α is
used to set the initial slope of the function; that is, the higher α
value makes the sharper S. On the other hand, the β means the
achievable minimum accuracy rate without any data analysis
when Qpqq “ 0. In this case, the lower β means the higher
achievable minimum accuracy.
B. Willingness-to-pay of the service consumers
Based on the service quality model, the data service provider
should anticipate the number of actual paid service consumers
to maximize its revenue and to decide the amount of budget
to buy a dataset from the market. Therefore, the trend of the
service consumers’ willingness-to-pay should be proposed.
Each service consumer has his/her own criteria to pay the
offered price for the service (i.e., the service consumer decides
whether to pay the offered price for the service or not).
Therefore, it is hard to separately formulate each individual’s
behavior for the data service provider’s perspective. In other
words, the WTP should be modeled as a macro level by
considering the cumulative distribution as the portion of the
paid consumers from the entire service consumer group.
To formulate the WTP function, this paper considers the
basic economic principles for demand: i) WTP decreases when
the offered price increases, ii) the service consumers prefer to
pay the service with higher quality, which is shown by many
studies related to the relationship with the service quality (or
user satisfaction) [46], [47]. With the analysis of the previous
studies about WTP [48], [49] and the proposed principles, the
WTP of the service consumers is defined as Definition 6.
Figure 4 shows the trends of the proposed WTP model
with various service quality factors (S). Note that the curves
of WTP from the real-world experiments [48], [49] and the
proposed function are similar. Moreover, the proposed WTP
function is well-fitted to reflect the actual results in the
references. It basically decreases when the price of dataset
increases, and it also rapidly decreases with lower quality and
slowly decreases with higher quality, respectively.
Definition 6 (Willingness-to-pay of the service consumers).
The WTP function Ψ of the service consumers is defined by
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) as the portion of
the paid service consumers in the potential service consumer
group that decides whether or not to pay based on the offered
price ps and the service quality S, and given by,
Ψpps, Sq “ e´psp1´Sq, (14)
where ps ě 0 and 0 ď S ă 1.
Based on the proposed models for the service quality S and
the WTP function Ψ, the profit function P of the data service
provider can be modeled as follows:
P pps, Bq “ psMΨpps, SpQpqpBqqqq ´B
“ psMe´psp1´SpQpqpBqqqq ´B,
where M is the number of service consumers, ps is the offered
price, and B is the budget to buy dataset q from all data
brokers in the market.
8Note that MΨpps, SpQpqpBqqqq means the expected num-
ber of service consumers with the offered price ps and the
offered service quality Q. Therefore, psMe´psp1´SpQpqpBqqqq
means the expected revenue from service consumers. On the
other hand, the budget B is the expected cost for buying
dataset. Then, the profit maximization problem can be for-
mulated as follows:
Problem 1 (Profit maximization of the data service provider).
max
ps,B
P pps, Bq
s.t. B ą 0, q˚pBq ą 0, R ą 0, ps ą 0.
where
qi˚ pBq “
BpR´ 1qpřRj“1 δj ´ δiR` δiq
přRj“1 δjq2 .
Note that q˚ with the fixed budget B (equation (9)) that
maximizes the service quality Q can be decided by the NE of
the CGDB from Theorem 1.
C. Profit maximization for the data service provider
In this section, the optimal strategy of the data service
provider that maximizes its profit P pps, Bq is solved (Problem
1). To this end, ps˚ is firstly obtained from the following
theorem with the fixed budget B (Theorem 2), and the optimal
budget B˚ of the data service provider is finally obtained from
the sequel theorem (Theorem 3).
Theorem 2. The optimal price is ps˚ that maximizes the profit
function of the data service provider is given by,
ps˚ “ 11´ SpBq
where
SpBq “ 1´ β
1` αQpq˚pBqq , and
qi˚ pBq “
BpR´ 1qpřRj“1 δj ´ δiR` δiq
přRj“1 δjq2 .
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Proof. First, the concaveness of the P with respect to ps is
checked by considering whether the second order derivative
of P is less than zero or not. Note that S P r0, 1q.
B
BpsP pps, Bq “ Me
pspS´1q `MpsepspS´1qpS ´ 1q
B
B2psP pps, Bq “ 2Me
pspS´1qpS ´ 1q `MpsepspS´1qpS ´ 1q2
ñ´MepspS´1qp1´ Sqp1` Sq ă 0.
Since the profit function P is a concave function, the
maximum point obtained by checking the first order derivative
with ps becomes zero.
BP pps, Bq
Bps “Me
pspS´1qp1` pspS ´ 1qq “ 0
ñ 1´ psp1´ Sq “ 0
6 ps˚ “ 11´ S .
From this theorem, the optimal solution of Problem 1, which
is the optimal strategy of the data service provider, is finally
obtained as the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The optimal strategy pps˚ , B˚q (for Problem 1)
of the data service provider that maximizes the profit based
on Theorem 2, is given by,
B˚ “ α
β
Me´1 ´ X
2
Y pR´ 1q
where
X “
Rÿ
l“1
δl,
Y “
ÿ
iPR
ÿ
jPR
ηij
b
pX ´ δiR` δiqpX ´ δjR` δjq,
and ps˚ is given by Theorem 2.
Proof. For the fixed budget B, the optimal price ps˚ of the data
service provider is a function of B, obtained from Theorem 2.
Now, denote the profit function P pps, Bq under the condition
ps “ ps˚ as Ps˚pBq, that is, Ps˚pBq “ P pps, Bq|ps“ps˚ .
Ps˚pBq
“ Me´1 p1` αQpBqq
β
´B
“ Me
´1
β
` α
β
Me´1 log
«
1`
ÿ
iPR
ÿ
jPR
ηij
?
qiqj
ff
´B
“´B ` Me
´1
β
` α
β
Me´1 log
«
1`BpR´ 1q
ˆ
ÿ
iPR
ÿ
jPR
ηij
c
pX ´ δiR` δiq
X2
c
pX ´ δjR` δjq
X2
ff
6 Ps˚pBq “ Me
´1
β
`α
β
Me´1 log
˜
1` Y pR´1q
X2
B
¸
´B,
9Similarly, the concaveness of the modified profit function
Ps˚pBq is checked by taking the second order derivative. If the
function Ps˚pBq is concave, then it has the unique maximum
point B˚ [38].
BPs˚pBq
BB “
α
β
Me´1
Y pR´ 1q
X2 ` Y pR´ 1qB ´ 1,
B2Ps˚pBq
BB2 “
α
β
Me´1
´pR´ 1q2Y 2
pX2 ` Y pR´ 1qBq2 ă 0.
Since the modified profit function Ps˚pBq is concave, there
exists the global maximum point B˚ that maximizes the entire
profit Ps˚pB˚q as follows.
BPs˚pBq
BB “
α
β
Me´1
Y pR´ 1q
X2 ` Y pR´ 1qB ´ 1 “ 0
6 B˚ “ α
β
Me´1 ´ X
2
Y pR´ 1q .
The required budget B˚ to maximize the profit of the
data service provider is obtained as a closed-form solution;
therefore, it can be easily applicable in the dynamic market.
Moreover, the main part of the result αβMe
´1 is only depended
upon its own characteristics (i.e., service quality and the num-
ber of service consumers); that is, the data service providers
can estimate their required budget without any information
about other data brokers in the market.
Based on the analysis about the data service provider, an
algorithm (Algorithm 1) is proposed for obtaining key results
(i.e., the required dataset quality (qi˚ ) and the allocated budget
(bi˚ ) for each data broker). The algorithm takes basic input
parameters: the number of services consumers (M ), the param-
eters for the service quality function (α, β, and η), the number
data brokers, and the unit price of each data broker pδqRi“1.
With the input parameters, the algorithm initializes common
variables X and Y (Theorem 3), and then it calculates the
total budget (B˚) that maximizes the profit of the data service
provider. Based on the total budget (B˚) and the unit price
of each data broker (pδqRi“1), it calculates the required dataset
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Data Service Provider
Input:
M : the number of service consumers
α, β, η: the parameters for the service quality function
R: the number of data brokers
pδiqRi“1: the unit price of each data broker
Initialization:
X “ řRi δi
Y “ řiPRřjPR ηijapX ´ δiR` δiqpX ´ δjR` δjq
Start algorithm:
B˚ “ αβMe´1 ´ X
2
Y pR´1q (Theorem 3)
Loop i to R:
qi˚ “ B
˚pR´1qpX´δiR`δiq
X2 (Theorem 1)
bi˚ “ X´δiR`δiX B˚ (Equation (1))
Output:
pqi˚ qRi“1: the required dataset quality for each data brokerpbi˚ qRi“1: the allocated budget for each data broker
quality qi˚ (Theorem 1) and the allocated budget bi˚ (Equation
(1)) for each data broker (i P R). Finally, the data service
provider can get the required dataset quality pqi˚ qRi“1 and the
allocated budget pbi˚ qRi“1 for all data brokers.
VI. PROFIT OPTIMIZATION FOR THE DATA BROKERS
This section describes an optimization problem for the data
brokers by defining an actual profit function (U¯i) that considers
a quality of dataset (qi) and a WTS function of the data
providers, who take their privacy into account as privacy
sensitivity of data types, for each data broker (di). The income
can be obtained by the price from the data service provider
(i.e., bi, the result of NE in Section IV), and the outcome
can be obtained by costs (ci) for buying data from the data
providers (Ni) with their WTS.
A. Willingness-to-sell data and the expected costs of the data
broker
Data brokers should anticipate the number of data providers
who actually participate in the market to minimize their cost.
Therefore, the WTS of the data providers should be modeled.
First, this paper defines a WTS function Φ also similar
to the authors’ previous work in [19] based on the real-
world experiment [18]. Since each data provider has their own
WTS with different privacy concerns, it is hard to directly
formulate the behavior of each data provider (i.e., with a
certain offered price, the person will decide whether to sell
his/her data or not). Therefore, similar to the WTP function,
the WTS function should be defined as a macro level; that
is, the cumulative distribution of WTS for the entire data
provider group. To define the WTS function, two principles
are applied. First, the more money is offered, the more people
participate. The second is the privacy sensitivity of data.
People hesitate to share or sell privacy sensitive data (e.g.,
many people think that information about credit card usage is
more privacy sensitive than that of location). Moreover, people
may have different WTS depending on the characteristics (e.g.,
popularity, reputation, etc.) of the data brokers even though
they handle the same data type. The survey showed that the
WTS to the trustworthy stakeholder is five times higher than
that to the untrustworthy one [50]. By fitting an appropriate
function with these principles and the real-world experiment
in [18], the WTS function is defined as Definition 7.
Definition 7 (Willingness-to-sell data). Willingness-to-sell of
a certain type of data (k P K) from data providers (NiPR) in
a data broker (diPR) is defined as follows:
Φi,kpci,kq “ 1´ e´ρi,kci,k (15)
where ρi,k is the privacy sensitivity parameter and ci,k is the
offered price for the kth type of data of ith data provider
group, respectively.
Note that the WTS function is affected not only the character-
istics of data (k) but also the characteristics of the data broker
(di).
Figure 5 shows the WTS function for variant parameter ρ.
Note that the data type with a smaller ρ is the more privacy
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Fig. 5. Willingness-to-sell as a function of data price
sensitive than that with a larger one. The WTS of less sensitive
data types increases more rapidly. This result is well-fitted to
the real-world experiment performed in [18].
With the WTS function, ni,k, the amount of the kth data
type collected by the data broker di from ith data provider
group (Ni) with a offered cost ci,k can be defined as follows:
ni,k “ NiΦi,kpci,kq (16)
Note that the unit price for kth data type is ci,k{ni,k. Then, the
total expected cost for buying all data in the ith data broker
Ei follows:
Eipciq “
ÿ
kPK
ci,k, (17)
where ci “ pci,kqKk“1.
B. Dataset quality function of the data broker
From the data brokers’ perspective, the method to measure
and quantify the value of the gathered dataset is needed to
decide whether they have good enough datasets for selling
in the market. Therefore, the concept of quality measure
for the dataset is from the authors’ previous work [19] by
considering both inherent data quality and the characteristics
of data similar to Definition 4. Then, a quality of dataset
provided by the data broker di is defined as follows.
Definition 8 (Quality of dataset provided by the data broker
di). The quality of dataset provided by the data broker di with
Ni data provider can be collected by,
qi “
ÿ
xPK
ÿ
yPK,y‰x
rxy
?
ni,xni,y, (18)
where ni,x and ni,y are the expected amount of the xth and
yth data type which can be collected by the data broker di,
respectively. rxy is the correlation between the data types.
Note that the geometric mean is used for quantifying quality
of dataset to consider not only characteristics of big data (e.g.,
accuracy, completeness, etc.) but also characteristics of privacy
data (e.g., identifiability, etc.), which is similar to Definition
4. As a result, the proposed model can measure not only the
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amount of data themselves but also their synergy effect with
correlation. If rxy “ 1 (x “ y) and rxy “ 0 (x ‰ y), then
it forms
ř
xPK 1 ´ e´cxρx which is the same as data quality
functions proposed in previous works [20], [21], [24].
C. Profit optimization for the data broker
Since the expected revenue is directly paid by the data
service provider as bi by equation (1) for the bidding dataset
with quality qi from the CGDB by equation (9) in Section IV,
and the expected cost is Ei by equation (17), the actual profit
function U¯i of the data broker di can be represented as
U¯ipbi, ciq “ bi ´ Eipciq. (19)
Since bi˚ (with qi˚ ), the maximum revenue, is decided by
the CGDB between the data broker di and the data service
provider, the profit function of the data broker can be reduced
as follows.
U¯i˚ pciq “ bi˚ ´
Kÿ
k“1
ci,k.
Then, the profit maximization problem can be transformed
to the cost minimization of the data broker di. Therefore, the
cost minimization problem is solved. From the definition of
the cost function Ei of the data broker di (equation (17)) the
optimization problem can be defined as follows:
Problem 2 (Cost minimization of the data broker).
min
c˚i
Eipciq, (20)
s.t. 0 ă ci,k ď 2
ρi,k
for all k P K, (21)
qi˚ “ Ni
ÿ
xPK
ÿ
yPK
rxy
ap1´ e´ci,xρi,xqp1´ e´ci,yρi,y q,
(22)
Ni ą 0, ρi,k P p0, 1q, @k P K,
R ě 2, B ą 0, (23)
where pc˚i,kqKk“1 P ci˚ is the data cost vector that minimizes
the cost function Eipci˚ q.
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Note that qi˚ is obtained from equation (9) in Section IV.
Since the optimization problem is bounded within the condi-
tion (21) (the detailed reason is described in Assumption 1),
it is possible to apply any constrained nonlinear optimization
algorithms (e.g., Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP))
that satisfy the conditions (21)-(23) [51]. Therefore, this paper
adopts the Sequential Least SQuares Programming (SLSQP)
method, which is widely used in SciPy (a de facto standard for
scientific Python) [52], originated from [53]. Figure 6 shows
an illustration of a problem set for the cost minimization
problem (Problem 2). With sample parameter settings listed
in Figure 6, it is verified that the result of the SLSQP solver
is the same as that of the exhaustive search1.
The SLSQP solver is one of trust-region SQP methods [54],
and it is hard to directly obtain the theoretical time complexity
of the SLSQP because it depends on detailed implementations
for finding internal parameters. Therefore, many benchmarking
experiments for various optimization algorithms have been
performed [55], [56]. Particularly, Varelas and Dahito showed
performance benchmarking results of various multivariate
solvers in SciPy, and it showed that the SLSQP solver has
the best performance in terms of the average runtime and the
statistical significance.
Since the WTS function is an asymptotic function, it is
needed to define a tangible problem space for the proposed
cost minimization problem. Based on the various surveys
related to WTS (which are [14], [15], [27], [57], and [58]),
the condition (21) is obtained by the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (The upper bound of the unit cost for the kth
data type). In order to consider a tangible problem space for
the cost minimization, the upper bound of the cost for each
data type is 2{ρ that makes the WTS value about 86% (i.e.,
Φip2{ρi,kq « 0.86 for each i P R and k P K). In other words,
about 14% of the data provider candidates refuses any privacy
valuation methods.
The report [57] surveyed the relationship between individu-
als’ preferences and their behavior for privacy, and it classified
the individuals into three categories based on their privacy
concerns, which are widely used in many areas related to
privacy:
‚ Privacy Fundamentalists (PF): the group simply refuses
any offer regarding privacy valuation (25% of the public);
‚ Privacy Pragmatists: the group weighs the value between
privacy valuation and privacy protection (57% of the
public);
‚ Privacy Unconcerned: the group less concerns about
privacy violation or abuse (18% of the public).
Assumption 1 is obtained by surveys related to the portion of
the PF groups in various areas. Woodruff et al. investigated
WTS privacy of data providers using the categories with
Google Consumer Surveys [58], and it showed that 35% of
respondents are fit into the PF category. Ponemon Institute
investigated a privacy profile similar to the categories above,
and it showed that 26% of the respondents are categorized
1An example of SLSQP application is available in https://github.com/
Hyeontaek-Oh/IEEE-IoTJ-2020/blob/master/slsqp-broker-opt-example.py
as the PF group [14]. Similarly, Jai and King conducted a
survey for finding the relationship between the WTS data of
individuals and the offered reward by a loyalty program in the
data brokering market for online advertisement [27]. It showed
that 15% of respondents are classified as the PF group. Growth
from Knowledge also surveyed the WTS data of individuals in
exchange for benefits or rewards, and it showed that 17% of
the respondents strongly disagree (i.e., the PF group) [15].
Assumption 1 gives in some intuitions to find the expected
unit price δi for obtaining dataset with quality qi of the data
broker di for the bidding market in Section IV. Since each data
broker chooses a bid without knowledge of others’ activities,
each data broker needs to assume all possible scenarios (e.g.,
the data service provider buys the entire dataset that can be
provided by the data broker); that is, it should consider the
maximum capability of each data broker. Therefore, based on
Assumption 1, the following is obtained.
Assumption 2. The unit price δi for dataset with quality qi
of the data broker di can be obtained by,
δi “ max
řK
k ci,k
max qi
“
ř
k
2
ρi,k
Ni
ř
xPK
ř
yPK rxyp1´ e´2q
(24)
Assumption 2 gives the unified unit price for each data
broker even if it has a different number of data providers with
different data types. This factor can be used for measuring
the relative competitiveness of each data broker in the market,
and a data service provider can predict the capability of data
brokers.
Note that, in this paper, the unit price for dataset δ is
decided with Assumption 1. For practical applications, each
data broker can decide the proper upper bound of the unit
cost considering the portion of the PF group in its domain as
already explained different statistics about PF groups above.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section shows numerical results based on the analysis
in the previous sections. First, this paper analyzes the optimal
solutions for a simple case that both the number of the data
brokers and the number of data types are two (i.e., R “ 2 and
K “ 2) in Section VII-A. Based on the analytic results of the
simple case, this paper shows the results for cases of multiple
brokers with multiple data types (i.e., R ą 2 and K ą 2)
with factors/parameters from the real-world dataset in Section
VII-B.
In order to perform numerical analysis, this paper configures
parameters as follows:
‚ Since the unit price δi is decided by the number of data
providers (Ni) and the privacy sensitivity ρi for each data
broker, similar to M , the reasonable values are chosen for
Ni. Note that if the gaps between pδiqRi“1 are too large, it
is not able to satisfy the condition (10) for the NE point,
that is,
řR
j“1 δj ´ δiR ` δi ą 0. In other words, it is
not possible to put the brokers with a large difference
of δ into the competition in the proposed CGDB model
because the gap of their unit prices is too large.
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‚ For the correlation factors of data types rxy for each data
broker and the correlation factors of datasets ηij are set
as follows:
rxy “
#
1 if x “ y
0.5 if x ‰ y and ηij “
#
1 if i “ j
0.5 if i ‰ j.
(25)
‚ For parameter β for the service quality function (S), it
is set as β “ 1 that means the data service provider has
no knowledge about their customers without dataset from
the brokers.
A. Theoretical experiment
This section checks various parameters for the proposed
model with the simple case (K “ 2 and R “ 2). In this
experiment, it is assumed that each data broker (d1 and d2)
has the same unit price for obtaining dataset (i.e., δ1 = δ2)
with different number of data providers and different data
types (i.e., N1 ‰ N2 and ρ1 ‰ ρ2). One data broker (d1)
handles two data types with similar privacy sensitivity, and
the other data broker (d2) handles them with different privacy
sensitivity. The detailed parameters are explained in Table II.
Before analyzing the behavior of the data brokers, this
section verifies the data service provider’s side related to
TABLE II
PARAMETERS FOR THEORETICAL EXPERIMENT
Parameters for service quality (S) β “ 1.0
# of data brokers R “ 2
# of data providers N1 “ 506, N2 “ 664
# of data types K “ 2
Privacy sensitivity factor ρ1 “ p0.035, 0.045q, ρ2 “ p0.020, 0.060q
Unit price for dataset δ1 “ 0.0929, δ2 “ 0.0929
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Fig. 9. The results of theoretical analysis for the data brokers with parameters
in Table II
WTP of the service consumers by checking various parameters
like α for the service quality S and the number of service
consumers M that are directly related to the optimal budget
allocation B˚ for the data service provider.
First, the parameter α related to the service quality S of
the data service provider is checked. Note that the higher α
means that the service quality function S increases more faster;
in other words, the data service provider is able to perform a
much better service with the same amount of dataset. Figure 7
shows the expected profits of the data service provider P for
the two variables, an offered service price ps and budget for
buying dataset B, with the same number of service consumers
M “ 1000 are follows:$’&’%
α “ 0.3 : P˚ “ 1049.32 at pps˚ , B˚q “ p3.15, 110.28q,
α “ 0.5 : P˚ “ 1493.89 at pps˚ , B˚q “ p4.56, 183.79q,
α “ 0.7 : P˚ “ 2030.89 at pps˚ , B˚q “ p6.22, 257.37q.
Since the parameter α directly affects the service quality
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that is also directly related to WTP of the service consumers,
the increment of α makes the offered price for the service ps
higher; that is, the data service provider earns higher profits, in
other words, the number of paid service consumers increases
(i.e., WTP of the service consumers increases).
Similarly, Figure 8 shows the trends of the data service
provider’s expected profit with respect to various number of
service consumers M with the fixed parameter α “ 0.5 as
follows:$’&’%
M “ 1000 : P˚ “ 1493.89 at pps˚ , B˚q “ p4.56, 183.79q,
M “ 3000 : P˚ “ 5087.62 at pps˚ , B˚q “ p5.11, 551.67q,
M “ 5000 : P˚ “ 8949.07 at pps˚ , B˚q “ p5.37, 919.55q.
Similar to α, the higher M makes the higher expected profit
P˚. However, the impact of M is different from that of α.
The α affects the offered service price ps. In contrast to α,
the M affects the available budget B; in other words, the total
number of paid service consumers increases.
The impacts of α and M have been analyzed from the data
service provider’s perspective so far. From now on, the detailed
results for the data brokers are analyzed. Figure 9 shows the
results regarding the data brokers with parameters in Table II.
With the budget B˚ (from Figure 8(a)), the NE analysis
of the data brokers is performed in Figure 9(a). Note that
both data brokers have the same NE point (i.e., the dataset
bidding q˚ “ 494.59 and the expected profit U˚ “ 45.95) that
maximizes their profits because they have the same unit price
δ. However, the actual profits of each data broker are different
because they have different data providers and handle data
types with different privacy sensitivity. Figure 9(b) shows the
actual expected costs for buying data to satisfy the required
dataset quality qi. At the NE point, the data broker d1 spends
more costs than d2; in other words, the actual profit of d2 is
larger than that of d1. It shows that the actual profit of data
brokers depends on the behavior of their data providers groups.
B. Experiments with the real-world dataset
The previous section has mainly analyzed the impacts of
parameters related to the data service provider. In this section,
the detailed analysis of data brokers with real-world datasets
is performed.
In order to perform the analysis, this paper configures
parameters as follows (also summarized in Table IV):
‚ Since the number of service consumers M affects only
the size of the budget B, there are relatively few restric-
tions on the parameter selection. Based on the detailed
analysis of the impacts of α and M performed in the
previous section (Section VII-A), this paper chooses the
reasonable number as M “ 3000 to valid the entire
trading market. Similarly, parameters α and β for the
service quality function (S) also affect the size of the
budget B; therefore, they are set as α “ 0.5 and β “ 1.0,
which means the data service provider has no knowledge
about their customers without dataset from the brokers.
‚ For the number of data brokers, this paper chooses R “ 3
for verifying the proposed CGDB model based on the
real-world surveys performed in [14], [59], [60]. These
surveys contain various results from respondents that are
related to the average price for each data type in the data
providers’ perspective. Based on the data in the surveys,
this paper chooses the number of data providers of each
data broker as Ni “ p282, 439, 1078q that are the number
of respondents in the surveys (which are [59], [60], and
[14], respectively).
‚ For privacy sensitivity factor ρ, this paper also adopts the
surveys in the previous bullet item related to the average
price for each data type in the data providers’ perspective.
It sets each ρk that makes the proposed WTS value 0.5
(50%) with the average price from the survey.
This paper chooses six data types (K “ 6) (i.e., payment
details, purchase histories, hobbies & preferences, photos
& videos, physical location: GPS, browsing histories)
that are commonly available from smartphones. Note that
each data type is available in the real-world dataset [61],
[62]. The unit price δi is decided by the number of data
providers (Ni) and the privacy sensitivity ρi for each data
broker.
For example, for Case 1, the average price value
c=(payments details($20.8), purchase histories($20.7),
preferences ($17.8), photos ($5.9), physical location:
GPS ($5.9), browsing histories($5.1)) can be mapped
into privacy sensitivity factor ρ=(0.0333, 0.0335, 0.0389,
0.1175, 0.1175, 0.1359), respectively.
‚ For the correlation factors of data types rxy for each data
broker and the correlation factors of datasets ηij are set
as equation (25).
Before directly checking the proposed CGDB with three
different cases with real-world parameters, this section an-
alyzes the impacts of the number of data providers when
each data broker has the same privacy sensitivity factors. To
analyze the trends and the behavior of data brokers, Case
2 parameters (in Table IV) are chosen for baseline. It is
assumed that five data brokers (note that each data broker
labeled as di) have different number of data providers (Niq
with the same privacy sensitivity factors (i.e., each data broker
has ρ “ p0.0154, 0.0181, 0.0265, 0.0307, 0.0415, 0.0889q. For
setting the number of data providers (N ), 439 (the number of
respondents in Case 2) ˘ 5% and ˘ 10% values are taken,
and the number of data providers Ni are set as N1 ă N2 ă
N3 ă N4 ă N5.
Table III shows the detailed analysis results. Since each data
broker has a different number of data providers (N ), available
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TABLE III
RESULTS OF THE CGDB WITH CASE 2 PARAMETERS IN TABLE IV
Ni δi q
˚
i b
˚
i U
˚
i (CGDB) U
˚
i (OPT) c
˚
i
d1 395 0.0981 573.89 63.66 7.34 45.63 (1.00, 1.24, 2.14, 2.65, 3.98, 7.01)
d2 417 0.0929 806.05 89.41 14.49 64.04 (1.63, 2.02, 3.40, 4.11, 5.77, 8.43)
d3 439 0.0883 1014.95 112.58 22.97 81.01 (2.25, 2.77, 4.53, 5.39, 7.19, 9.43)
d4 461 0.0841 1203.90 133.54 32.33 96.81 (2.81, 3.45, 5.51, 6.46, 8.32, 10.17)
d5 483 0.0802 1375.64 152.59 42.20 111.62 (3.30, 4.05, 6.34, 7.33, 9.20, 10.74)
TABLE IV
PARAMETERS FOR EXPERIMENT WITH THE REAL-WORLD DATASET
M 3000
S Param. (α, β) = (0.5, 1.0)
R 3
Broker Case 1 Broker Case 2 Broker Case 3
N 282 439 1078
K 6
δ 0.066793 0.088289 0.023893
c (20.8, 20.7, 17.8, 5.9, 5.9, 5.1) (45.1, 38.4, 26.2, 22.6, 16.7, 7.8) (36.0, 20.6, 16.1, 12.2, 12.2, 7.1)
ρ (0.0333, 0.0335, 0.0389, (0.0154, 0.0181, 0.0265, (0.0193, 0.0336, 0.0431,
0.1175, 0.1175, 0.1359) 0.0307, 0.0415, 0.0889) 0.0568, 0.0568, 0.0976)
δ 0.066793 0.088289 0.023893
unit prices δi, offered to the data service provider, are different.
Note that a data broker with a lower δ is relatively more
competitive in the market than that with a higher δ; that is, the
data broker d5 is more competitive than d1 in this case. Based
on the unit price δ, each data broker takes different required
dataset quality qi˚ and budget bi˚ , which are directly related to
the entire profit Ui˚ . The more competitive data broker takes
the more budget with a higher dataset quality requirement.
Moreover, similar to the previous section, the behavior of
each data broker with variant bidding strategies, including the
NE strategy, is analyzed in Figure 10(a). Each plot shows the
profit trends of each data broker when all other data brokers
already take bidding with NE strategies. It shows that the profit
of each data broker is only maximized at the point of NE; in
other words, other bidding strategies result in each data broker
losing some profits. The more competitive data broker has a
greater chance to get a higher profit with bidding because it
has a greater chance to satisfy the required dataset quality at a
lower cost. Figure 10(b) shows the expected minimum cost of
each data broker to achieve the required dataset quality from
the data service provider. It shows that the data broker with
the more data providers spends fewer costs to the collected
dataset to satisfy the data service provider because it has a
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Fig. 11. The result at the NE point for each data broker (Case 2)
higher chance of collecting more datasets with the same costs.
It means that the data broker becomes more competitive in
terms of dataset quality when the number of data providers
increases.
Next, the difference between the expected profit by the
CGDB and the actual profit by the proposed additional opti-
mization is analyzed. Figure 11(a) shows the expected profit by
the proposed CGDB (left) and the actual profit by the proposed
cost minimization results (right) at the NE point for each
data broker. The detailed results are marked as U˚(CGDB)
and U˚(OPT) in Table III, respectively. It shows that the
actual profit (U˚(OPT)) is higher than the expected profit
(U˚(CGDB)) because each data broker participates in the
market with the expected unit price δ defined in Assumption
2 to cover various cases in the market. However, when the
bidding budget is set by the CGDB, each data broker can
target its data providers to minimize costs for buying a dataset.
Therefore, each data broker can achieve a higher profit than
the expected profit in the CGDB.
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Moreover, the costs ci˚ of each data broker are also analyzed
in Figure 11(b). It shows that each data broker spends different
costs even if it deals with the same data types with the
same privacy sensitivity factor to maximize their utilities
while satisfying the required dataset qi˚ . The data broker with
a higher profit requires more dataset for the data service
provider, i.e., dataset buyer, that means it spends more costs
for collecting dataset.
Finally, with the configured parameters from the real-world
dataset in Table IV, this paper analyses NE of each data broker
with totally different characteristics (i.e., all three cases have
different numbers of data providers and different values of
privacy sensitivity factor). Figure 12 shows the detailed NE
analysis for the proposed CGDB with three different data
broker cases:$’&’%
Broker Case 1 : U˚ “ 35.49 at qi˚ “ 1563.66,
Broker Case 2 : U˚ “ 0.099 at qi˚ “ 82.58,
Broker Case 3 : U˚ “ 296.45 at qi˚ “ 4519.45.
(26)
Since the difference of unit price values δ among three
brokers are quite large (note that the δ values of data broker
cases are 0.067, 0.088, 0.024, respectively), the behavior of
data brokers is quite extreme. Particularly, the data broker of
Case 3 is dominant in the market, but the data broker of Case
2 has no competitiveness in the market. Figure 12 shows the
change of profits with a variation of bidding when other data
brokers already take optimized NE strategies. The expected
profit by the CGDB is maximized only at the point of NE
for each data broker. Note that the profit of the data broker of
Case 2 becomes zero after the bidding 3000 because it reaches
the maximum achievable dataset quality; in other words, the
Case 2 cannot bid more than its maximum achievable dataset
quality. In addition, at the NE points, Figure 13 shows the
expected profit of data brokers by the proposed CGDB model
and the actual profit of them by the proposed cost minimization
model. Similar to Figure 11(a), the actual profit by the cost
minimization model is higher than the expected profit by the
CGDB model.
In summary, the results show that data brokers should esti-
mate their relative competitiveness in the data market before
bidding datasets, and to increase their market competitiveness,
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they need to increase the number of data providers who
actually sell their data to data brokers. Since many surveys
identified the trust gap between data providers and other
business stakeholders (e.g., data brokers and data service
providers) [17], [50], [63], [64] (i.e., data providers hesitate to
participate the data market due to lack of trust), it is needed to
ensure trust of data providers by providing necessary actions
(e.g., provide transparency of data flow, control of data usage,
etc.) that ultimately increase their market participation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
With the widespread of IoT devices, data-driven services
and applications become more popular. In keeping with these
trends, much research has focused on IoT data markets
and data trading issues from the data business stakeholders’
perspective (i.e., data brokers, data consumers, etc.). Since
the conflict issues are raised between privacy protection and
innovation of IoT services/applications through data analytics,
current IoT data markets are mainly categorized as privacy
protection markets and privacy valuation markets, respectively.
For the privacy valuation markets, data providers also have
the need for proper benefits in exchange for their privacy;
hence, they should also be considered as an important player
in IoT data markets. Therefore, this paper has proposed a
competitive data trading model with privacy valuation for
multiple stakeholders in IoT data markets while considering
not only the characteristics of data consumers but also those
of data providers, who weigh the value between privacy
protection and valuation and have the willingness to participate
in the market with proper benefits. To model the market, this
paper has considered four major stakeholders to cover various
IoT data value chains (i.e., data providers (or data sources),
data brokers, a data service provider (or data consumer), and
service consumers). Particularly, this paper has proposed the
CGDB model (a non-cooperative game model) between data
brokers and a data service provider with the unified measure of
the unit price of the dataset from data brokers for comparing
the competitiveness of them with different data providers. This
paper has also proposed the optimization models considering
the relationship between a data broker and data providers (i.e.,
willingness-to-sell (WTS) data with privacy sensitivity factors)
as well as the relationship between a data service provider and
service consumers (i.e., willingness-to-pay (WTP) provided
service with service quality). Based on the Nash Equilibrium
and the optimization analysis of the proposed model, this
paper has showed the feasibility of the proposed model with
the parameters from real-world dataset while showing the
existence of unique Nash Equilibrium point that maximizes
benefits of business stakeholders while satisfying the require-
ments from all market participants (e.g., WTS, WTP, dataset
quality, etc.). Since each proposed model (e.g., dataset quality,
WTS, WTP, etc.) is one of the possible models to analyze the
behavioral characteristics based on the observation of real-
world experiments, as future work, various WTS and WTP
mathematical models can be considered to design the behavior
of data providers and services consumers more realistically,
along with various cost models for data management (e.g.,
computing, storage, etc.).
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